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vAbstract
Design of a modular exponentiation module for an RSA cryptographic
coprocessor with power analysis countermeasures
by Néstor TUNEU ARROYO
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) is a widely used public key cryptographic method. The main
operation performed in this method, for encryption and decryption, is modular exponentia-
tion. The way modular exponentiation is computed make the system vulnerable to side-
channel attacks. Side-channel attacks focus on the physical implementation rather than
in the algorithms vulnerabilities. In particular, power analysis attacks are a type of side-
channel attack that focuses on extracting information from the power consumption trace.
The main thesis goals are to design, verify and obtain the specifications of a Simple Power
Analysis (SPA) resistant coprocessor. A coprocessor and the hardware design are introduced
because the case of study in this thesis requires a fast implementation of the RSA method.
The proposed design work with 4096-bit keys, following the recommendations of NIST Spe-
cial Publication 800-57 Part 1. Thus, the design focuses on area optimization while dealing
with large keys.
This design is presented in an easy-going schematic form, but, the fully functional version
is presented using the hardware description language VHDL. By using Cadence ® software,
the design is simulated and the implemented countermeasures are verified with a 16-bit
version. These proposed countermeasures seek not to increase power consumption or exe-
cution time. In order to compare against an SPA vulnerable system, this reference version is
also designed and simulated. The power traces for both versions are obtained to assess the
effectiveness of the applied countermeasure.
In order to get realistic results, the design has been synthesized in a 1.2V standard 65 nm
CMOS library.
The final proposed solution manages the area problem by using only one 4098-bit adder /
subtractor into a Montgomery Product (MP) sequential scheme. This adder / subtractor is
a type of Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA), in order to reduce delay. In particular, Ladner-Fischer
topology is used. This reduces the number of wire tracks and logic levels, which help to
synthesize this kind of huge adder.
The specifications obtained for the 4096-bit version allow the main system clock to run at
about 100 MHz. In the SPA resistant version, this means a modular exponentiation can be
computed, in average, in about 504 ms.

Resum
Disseny d’un mòdul d’exponenciació modular per a un co-processador
criptogràfic RSA amb contramesures d’anàlisi de potència
per Néstor TUNEU ARROYO
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) és un mètode criptogràfic de clau pública àmpliament utilitzat.
La operació principal en aquest mètode, per encriptar i desencriptar, és l’exponencial mod-
ular. La manera com es computa l’exponencial modular fa el sistema vulnerable a atacs de
canal lateral. Els atacs de canal lateral se centren en atacar el dispositiu físic, i no els algo-
rismes. En particular, els atacs d’ànalisi de potència són un tipus d’atac de canal lateral que
se centren en extreure informació de la traça de consum.
Els objectius principals del treball són dissenyar, verificar i obtenir les especificacions d’un
co-processador resistent a atacs simples d’ànalisi de potència (SPA). El co-processador i el
disseny en hardware s’introdueixen ja que el cas d’estudi del treball demanda una imple-
mentació ràpida del mètode RSA. El disseny proposat funciona amb claus de 4096 bits,
seguint les recomanacions de NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1. Així doncs, el disseny
se centra en optimitzar l’àrea, tot operant amb claus llargues.
El disseny es presenta de manera senzilla en format esquemàtic, però, la versió plenament
funcional es presenta mitjançant codi VHDL. Mitjançant el programari de Cadence ®, el dis-
seny és simulat i les contramesures verificades, amb una versió de 16 bits. Aquestes con-
tramesures busquen no augmentar el consum de potència o el temps d’execució. Per tal de
comparar aquest disseny amb un de vulnerable front SPA, aquest últim també és simulat.
Les traces de consum per ambdues versions s’obtenen per tal d’avaluar l’efectivitat de la
contramesura.
Per tal d’obtenir resultats realistes, la síntesi es realitza utilitzant una llibreria CMOS estàn-
dard d’1.2V i 65 nm.
La solució final aborda el problema de l’àrea utilitzant únicament un sumador/restador de
4098 bits dins un esquema seqüencial d’un producte de Montgomery (MP). Aquest sumador
/restador és del tipus prefix paral·lel (PPA), per tal de reduir el retard. En particular, s’ha
utilitzat la topologia Ladner-Fisher. Això redueix el nombre de connexions i nivells lògics,
cosa que ajuda en la síntesi d’un sumador tan gran. Les especificacions obtingudes per la
versió de 4096 bits permeten que el rellotge principal del sistema pugui operar a uns 100
MHz. En la versió resistent a SPA, això vol dir que l’exponencial modular pot ser calculada,
en mitjana, en uns 504 ms.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Personal Background
As a student, in the last year, I have been working with Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC)
systems in the QiNE research group at the ETSEIB-UPC’s Department of Electronic Engi-
neering. The work have been about differential scan-based side-channel attacks and coun-
termeasures in cryptographic systems designed for testability. Since I had to do some bibli-
ographic search in that topic, I realized there are other widely used public key methods.
That is the reason why I have choosen Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) method in this
work, because it is the other main asymmetric cryptographic system used nowadays, which
I did not know nothing about. In the same way, I would like to explore other kinds of attacks
and countermeasures, different from differential scan-path. Power analysis techniques play
that role in this thesis.
Also, I am interested in high performance arithmetic circuits. Few months ago, I started
reading (by own decision) the book Synthesis of Arithmetic circuits: FPGA, ASIC and Embedded
Systems, which also is the main bibliographic reference I have used [1]. The merge of these
facts is my main motivation to work on.
1.2 Case of Study
Despite main topics in this work have not been presented yet, with a few definitions the
case of study can be presented. A public key cryptographic system is a communication
system that allows to send and receive messages through an insecure channel. Thus, an
external opponent would not be able to get information without the hidden private key,
which is a long prime number. Encrypting operation is not bijective or is too much complex.
Then, even though public key can be obtained through the insecure channel, there is not
enough information to decrypt the messages. Nowadays, for example, all this is important
to increase security on mobile instantaneous wireless communications.
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In general, RSA, ECC and other cryptographic systems use that kind of long private keys.
Key length is related to security in these systems, but it is a challenge for the system per-
forming the computation. This is because execution time is related in some way with the
length of the key and messages. Without a dedicated hardware, to execute cryptographic
algorithms in simple processors could be too slow for some applications. Communication
delay, as shown in the mobile example, it is an important factor in real time systems.
Let us suppose in this work that the final application requires a fast implementation, thus
introducing the necessity of a cryptographic coprocessor and discarding slower software
implementations on microprocessors.
Then, two more important facts appear in the design stage. Firstly, the area. Area in elec-
tronics refeer to the physical surface where an integrated circuit is fabricated. Since keys
and messages are long, circuits to operate with them are going to be large too. The way
this issue has been managed in this work is to reuse some physical circuits in different algo-
rithm operations of the same kind, which is the same as sequentializing. This technique will
probably slow down the execution, so fast arithmetic circuits are required.
Secondly, the power consumption. Power consumption depends on the circuit architecture
and transistor technology. Since the architecture variables will be fixed with delay and area
constrains, and technology is a too wide topic to consider with rigor in this work, the power
consumption will be considered a dependent variable. Nevertheless, the power consump-
tion will be important when designing against power analysis attacks.
Power analysis is a type of side-channel attack. Since cryptographic methods are designed
to be resistant to algorithm attacks, side-channel attacks are a type of attack that focus on
the physical implementation of the system, in order to retrieve the private key. In particular,
power analysis focuses in the system power trace when an operation related with the private
key is performed.
Thus, in order to find a solution to this case of study, thesis goals are:
• To elaborate a state of the art revision of arithmetic and power analysis attacks and
countermeasures applied to RSA systems.
• To design a functional exponentiation module to encrypt or decrypt messages.
• To protect the designed module against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks.
The way these goals are achieved through this thesis is: state of the art revision in Chapter 2,
modular exponentiation module design and countermeasure selection in Chapter 3, verifica-
tion plan and results presentation in Chapter 4 and finally results discussion, costs estimation
and conclusions in Chapter 5. Appendix A contains the complete VHDL module description.
Appendix B contains Cadence ® the commands needed to carry out the simulations and the
synthesis.
3Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter includes an state of the art revision of the main topics of the work. Some defi-
nitions and algorithms are introduced, as well as the explanation for the RSA cryptographic
method and power analysis attacks and countermeasures.
2.1 RSA Cryptographic Method
The first time RSA cryptographic method appeared was in A method for obtaining digital sig-
natures and public-key cryptosystems [2] in 1978. Since then, there have not been changes in
the structure of the method. Taking this into account, let us explain the method from an
easy-going point of view. All the demonstrations and properties are included in [2]. Later,
an overall scheme of an asymmetric cryptographic system will be introduced.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, RSA, as a secure communication method, allows the transmis-
sion of encrypted data through an insecure channel. To establish the communication, a
public key is used. This public key has a relation with the private key, which is hidden by
the owner. To illustrate how the process works, let us see an example:
The user A wants to send a message to the user B. Firsly, A sends a request to B to start the
communication. B generates a public key and sends it to A. The generation of the public and
private keys for user B is done using two prime numbers v and w. A public key Q is choosen
(see numeric example) and the private key K is determined by usign this congruence:
Q · K ≡ 1 (mod (v− 1) · (w− 1)) (2.1)
Later, A converts its message M using a padding scheme into a number m lower than u = v ·
w. When this conversion is completed, A encrypts its message m by using the next equation,
where E is the encryption of message m:
E = mQ (mod u) (2.2)
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After that, A sends this information to B who decrypts the message by using the next for-
mula and later M from m:
m = EK (mod u) (2.3)
As shown, there is only one operation needed to do all the cryptographic computations:
modular exponentiation. It is for this reason that work focuses on that module. The padding
scheme is used to get a transferable representation and to increase security. In the Public-Key
Cryptography Standard #1 (PKCS #1) the padding scheme is the Optimal Asymmetric Encryp-
tion Padding (OAEP). To illustrate the communication between the users, Figure 2.1 shows
the scheme of how transmission is done.
FIGURE 2.1: Public-key cryptograhic communication system
Let us see a numeric example. Let us suppose v = 113, w = 221 and m = 18593 after the
padding. Then, u = v · w = 23843. Now, Q is choosen as 37 (coprime with lcm((v − 1) ·
(w− 1)) = 6160). By using (2.1), then K = 333. Thus, encryption and decryption in an A to
B communication:
(A) EA = mAQB (mod u) = 1859337 (mod 23843) = 8010
(B) mA = EAKB (mod u) = 8010333 (mod 23843) = 18593
One fundamental property of RSA is asymmetry. This concept applied to cryptography
means two devices can communicate using two different private keys. As mentioned, they
will need public key generations to set a secure communication. Usually, asymmetric meth-
ods are used to start symmetric key implementations. At the beginning, RSA can be used
to secure send a common private key to start a symmetric communication method, which is
faster.
The RSA method has been proven as completely secure if anyone can extract information
from the physical devices (black box assumption), since private keys are stored within the
system itself.
In the last decade cryptography has gotten relevance and the main differences between de-
vices are the cryptographic operations and algorithms to compute modular exponentiation.
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2.2 Power Analysis on RSA
Power analysis is a kind of side-channel attack, which focuses on the physical implementa-
tion of a system, rather than in its algorithms. Although there are more methods of power
analysis than the two presented in this section, as HO-DPA (High Order), simple and dif-
ferential power analysis are widely used because system security usually can be overpassed
with them. The main reference used in this section is doctoral thesis [3].
2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
An SPA attack consists in analyzing the power consumption of a physical device when an
operation using the private key is being performed. Usually devices perform different oper-
ations depending on the current bit of the private key. Many algorithms evolve sequentially
using the private key bits. Therefore, the opponent can discover if the current bit in the
private key is 0 or 1, by observing the power consumption trace.
In RSA, SPA can be used during a modular exponentiation. Depending on the bit of the
private key, system performs a multiplication and a doubling when the bit is 1 and just
doubling when the bit is 0. Consequently, the power consumption of the system is higher if
the bit is 1.
There are three main ways to protect cryptographic systems against SPA. All respective orig-
inal documents of the algorithms mentioned can be found in [3]. The first method, consists
in performing the two different operations (multiplication and doubling) at the same time,
either if one of them is unnecessary. This idea is the base of Montgomery ladder algorithm.
The second method consists in unifying the execution. This means to execute the same set of
operations, without differences. An example of that is Binary Huff curve-based SPA-resistant
implementation, in this case for ECC.
The last method consists in an atomic execution. A sequence of operations is stablished and
always is done in the same way. An example of that is Atomic right-to-left algorithm for RSA.
Finally, although these methods can protect against SPA, they do not change the algorithm
structure, data or partial results. This means all that the presented countermeasures can be
overpassed with DPA.
2.2.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
DPA, in opposition to SPA, do not observe the power consumption of different operations.
DPA consists in observing the power consumption of different data through the same oper-
ation. However, the differences in power consumption on different data are tiny, so several
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runs must be performed with a posterior offline statistical data analysis to retrieve the pri-
vate key from the deduction of the partial results.
This kind of attacks are more complex, but they can deal with SPA countermeasures. Then,
DPA countermeasures must be introduced. Most countermeasures are based on the idea
of random masking. At the beginning of the algorithm, data is randomly masked. Then,
operations are executed and finally the data is unmasked to retrieve the final result. On RSA,
two types of data can be masked: the base or the exponent, both on modular exponentiation.
In [3], a DPA side-channel attack is presented to retrieve the private key successfully in an
SPA countermeasures scenario. However, the same DPA attack becomes useless when DPA
countermeasures are in place.
Once attacks and countermeasures have been introduced, it must be noticed that this thesis
focuses on SPA attacks and countermeasures, as it has been presented in the thesis goals.
2.3 Fast Arithmetic on RSA
The aim of this section is to find an efficient algorithm for modular exponentiation. Since
this algorithm will be sequentialized, also it is necessary to find a fast addition algorithm
to allow an increase in the clock speed. The main reference in this section is Synthesis of
Arithmetic circuits: FPGA... [1]. In particular, the chapters 3 (addition) and 8 (finite field).
Support references are [4]–[6].
2.3.1 Modular Exponentiation
As seen in the RSA section, the main operation in RSA is modular exponentiation. Let us
define a base β and an exponent α with the typical binary representation, where n is the
number of bits and αi ∈ [0,1]:
α = αn−1 · 2n−1 + αn−2 · 2n−2 + ...+ α1 · 21 + α0 (2.4)
Then, the Horner’s scheme brings an efficient way to write the modular exponentiation e =
βα (mod u), where u < 2n:
e = βα (mod u) = ((...((12 · (βαn−1)2) · βαn−2)2...)2 · βα1)2 · βα0 (mod u) (2.5)
This structure, as an algorithm, includes a modular doubling operation for each bit and also
includes a modular multiplication if αi = 1. In a modular doubling operation, e variable gets
the remainder of the division (e · e)/u, which also includes a multiplication. For each αi = 1,
also one (e · β)/u division is performed:
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Algorithm 2.1
e = 1
for i = 1 : n
e = e · e (mod u)
if αi == 1→ e = e · β (mod u)
end
As seen, there are too many operations per bit. To reduce the algorithm delay, Mont-
gomery Product (MP) is introduced. Although MP is going to be explained later,
below there is an algorithm which computes the modular exponentiation using it:
Algorithm 2.2
et = 2n (mod u)
βt = MP(β, 22n (mod u))
for i = 1 : n
et = MP(et, et)
if αi == 1→ et = MP(et, βt)
end
e = MP(et, 1)
In the algorithm above, no divisions are performed, since mod u only affects con-
stant values (2n (mod u) and 22n (mod u)), that can be computed previously.
2.3.2 Modular Product
As introduced in the last subsection, MP reduces the delay in the modular exponen-
tiation. Thus, let us explain why by analyzing the modular product.
In Algorithm 2.1 the main operation is the modular product. A first way to calculate
it is the Multiply and reduce scheme, where x · y product is computed to obtain h and
then a division is performed to compute the quotient q and the remainder r, which
is the result of a modulo u operation.
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Since division is a long operation, an alternative to Multiply and reduce is performing
the modulo operation at every step. This strategy is known as Modulo u Shift-and-
add algorithm. Algorithm 2.3 is the general base-2 version, that is named Shift-and-add
because multiplication by 2 is left-shift in binary.
Algorithm 2.3
hn = 0
for i = 0 : n− 1
hn−1−i = (2 · hn−i + xn−1−i · y) (mod u))
end
r = h0
By using some properties, the last algorithm can be simplified to avoid modular
operations. Since this algorithm is not going to be used, it is not worth it to explain
it with detail. However, the idea is also used in MP: to avoid division operation to
obtain remainder. Let us see how this can be achieved.
Given an odd value u, in particular, prime, and the operands x < u, y < u, the idea
is try to find a number r′ so that:
x · y (mod u) = r′ · 2n (mod u) (2.6)
Since u is odd, the greatest common divisor between u and 2n is 1. Then, it has to
exist a number 2−n so that 2n · 2−n = 1. Thus:
r′ = x · y · 2−n (mod u) (2.7)
This equation is used in MP to compute r′, shown below. Lemmas 8.1 and 8.2 in [1]
include an explanation of why f is defined in this way and a proof of rn < 2u, which
means r′ is rn or rn − u.
Algorithm 2.4
r0 = 0
for i = 1 : n
f = ri−1 + xi−1 · y
ri = ( f + f0 · u)/2
end
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if rn < u→ r′ = rn
if rn ≥ u→ r′ = rn − u
Once algorithm is defined, let us explain how modular product is computed from
MP. By using expression (2.7), the next relations can be deduced:
r = x · y (mod u) = x · y · 2−n · 22n · 2−n (mod u) = r′ · 22n · 2−n (mod u) (2.8)
r = MP(MP(x, y), 22n (mod u)) (2.9)
The expression (2.9) also defines the algorithm to compute modular product. In
this relation 22n (mod u) must be precomputed to reduce the execution time. In
Algorithm 2.2 a change of variable is performed to simplify computation and at the
end of the algorithm it is inverted by using:
MP(et, 1) = et · 2−n (mod u) = e · 2n · 2−n (mod u) = e (mod u) (2.10)
Since Algorithm 2.4 is composed of additions and subtractions, the next subsection
will focus on such kind of arithmetic operations and how they can be efficiently
implemented in hardware.
2.3.3 Addition / Subtraction
To begin with the addition review, let us present in the first place the handwritten
binary addition algorithm. In Algorithm 2.5, a and b represent the operands, c the
carry and s the result. This type of adder is known as Ripple Carry Adder.
Algorithm 2.5
for i = 0 : n− 1
si = ai + bi + ci (mod 2)
if ai + bi + ci > 1→ ci+1 = 1
if ai + bi + ci ≤ 1→ ci+1 = 0
end
Notice that, the algorithm execution time is proportional to the number of bits n.
This delay can be reduced by defining two new functions: propagate carry pi and
generate carry gi. Explained in words, generation happens when the input ci does
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not matter and the carry output ci+1 is 1. This is equivalent to ai + bi = 2 or logic
operation gi = ai and bi.
Propagation happens when ai + bi = 1, which is equivalent to the logic operation
pi = ai or bi. Propagation implies that ci+1 = ci. Since propagation and generation
only depend on operands, they can be computed in parallel. Algorithm 2.6 has an
execution time presenting a linear dependence with n, but not strictly proportional.
Algorithm 2.6
for i = 0 : n− 1
pi = ai or bi
gi = ai and bi
end
for i = 0 : n− 1
ci+1 = gi or (pi and ci)
end
for i = 0 : n− 1
si = ai + bi + ci (mod 2)
end
In fact, a last change can be done to achive the fastest adder, known as Carry Look-
ahead Adder (CLA). As seen, the carry function is:
ci+1 = gi or (pi and ci) = gi + pici (2.11)
Thus, by using a composition, carry computation loop can almost be parallelized to
achieve logaritmic delay in relation to n. Algorithm 2.7 corresponds to the idea of a
n-bit CLA adder where each loop can be parallelized, as carry computations. The
notation has changed: + means or, ⊕means xor and ·means and.
Algorithm 2.7
for i = 0 : n− 1
pi = ai + bi
gi = aibi
end
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c1 = g0 + p0c0
c2 = g1 + p1g0 + p1p0c0
c3 = g2 + p2g1 + p2p1g0 + p2p1p0c0
...
cn = gn−1 + pn−1gn−2 + pn−1pn−2gn−3 + ...+ pn−1pn−2...p1p0c0
for i = 0 : n− 1
si = ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci
end
In the last algorithm, carry computation pattern is shown. Anyway, if n is large,
specific algorithms are defined to compute the recurrent function of the carries. This
type of adders are known as Parallel Prefix Adders (PPA). The proposed design is
going to be one of this kind.
FIGURE 2.2: Taxonomy of prefix graphs [7]
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In the 2003 paper A taxonomy of parallel prefix networks [7], an excellent PPAs com-
pilation can be found. In fact, there is a great 3D comparative analysis of the most
known PPA topologies which supports the election of the best topology for each
application. Figure 2.2 shows this 3D graph comparative.
In [1], Brent-Kung and Ladner-Fischer topologies are explained in detail. Nowa-
days, the Kogge-Stone topology is the fastest. However, as seen in the graph, its
high number of wire tracks makes a 4098-bit synthesis unappropiate using it. In the
design chapter, the selection of the topology will be discussed.
As commented in the last section, also a subtraction is needed in the MP. In Algorithm
2.7, the subtraction is computed by making the logical inverse of b and by setting
c0 = 1. Therefore, c0 can be used as an add/subtract selection signal. This is known
as Two complement addition, that is the same as subtraction.
To conclude this section, remember that CLA is introduced because in RSA cryptog-
raphy, the number of bits n is large, and a proportional or linear delay would make
the execution too slow.
2.4 CMOS and Other Considerations
To conclude this chapter, we are going to talk about the implications of manufac-
turing technology. In order to properly design a modular exponentiation module,
gates non idealities must be taken into account. Two of these non idealities are gate
delay and fanout. The information of this subsection has been obtained from [8].
Complementary Metal Oxyde Semiconductor (CMOS) is a manufacturing technol-
ogy which uses pairs of nNOS and pMOS transistors forming a p network in charge
of driving the output to the logic level 1 and a n network in charge of driving the
output to the logic level 0. In few words, the advantages are a low static power con-
sumption and a great robustness against noise. CMOS is the mainly used fabrication
technology nowadays, that is the reason why it has been choosen for this work.
In this work, three parameters are considered crucial for the targeted application:
number of transistors and gate delay and fanout. In CMOS technology, NOT gates
have one nMOS and one pMOS transistors, 2-input NOR and NAND gates have
two of each kind. XOR, AND and OR gates are compositions of the previous gates.
However, although NOR and NAND gates have the same number of transistors, the
NAND gate presents a lower delay. This is because a NAND has two series nMOS
transistors and a NOR has two series pMOS. Since pMOS transistors are slower (less
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conductive) than nMOS ones, the NAND gate is faster for equivalent dimensioned
transistors.
This is an important fact to be considered in order to design a fast circuit with a
large number of gates. In fact, since NAND gate is a complete set of gates, any logic
function can be designed using it.
The fanout concept refeers to the number of gates that can be linked to an output
line of a gate. In the library used in this thesis, for example, the 3-input NOR gate
with 2-fanout is named NOR3X2.
Once manufacturing technology implications have been explained, let us introduce
other considerations:
• Quine-McCluskey algorithm and Karnaugh map are two of the techniques which
reduce logic expressions to their minimal form. The two ways to express that
form are Sum of Products (SOP) and Product of Sums (POS), where product and
sum are logic operations. These algorithms are going to be required to present
the schematics in the design chapter.
• Hardware Description Languages (HDLs) are languages used to define circuits on
behaviour or structural domain. There are compilers which interpret HDLs to
synthesize electronic circuits. Then, these circuits can be simulated or fabri-
cated. The main HDLs are VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuit) HDL
(VHDL) and Verilog.
• The software used in this work includes ncsim, ncelab, ncvhdl and Encounter RTL
Compiler. These are all Cadence ® software required to simulate and synthesize
the VHDL based designs.
The next chapter is dedicated specifically to the design and the implementation of
the modular exponentiation module with security countermeasures.
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Chapter 3
Secure Modular Exponentiation
Module Design
This chapter includes the design of the modular exponentiation module. When nec-
essary, some algorithms and schematics are also included, some of them as an ex-
tension of the state of the art chapter.
3.1 Arithmetic Approach
In order to start designing the modular exponentiation module, this section intro-
duces its arithmetic circuits in structural domain, each one linked to the algorithms
presented in the last chapter.
3.1.1 Overall Structure
The first main decision that has to be taken to define the structure is the private key
size. In NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 [9], a recommendation of key size is
given. Beyond 2030, for RSA cryptosystems, using private keys of 2048 bits or less
will be not secure enough. So, considering that the system will be implemented in
hardware with a long-term usage, a convenient key size for the design is 4096 bits.
Taking this into account, let us review Algorithm 2.2 to start with the design. This
algorithm has four steps. The first step consists in two changes of variable. One
of them perform an MP. The second step is related with MP(et, et). The third step
computes MP(et, β) and the last step is to undo the change of variable by using
MP(et, 1). Thus, these steps can be encoded in binary, using multiplexation to se-
lect each one of the steps. By doing that, the circuit is only going to need one MP
operator. The next shematic, Figure 3.1, shows the overall circuit.
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FIGURE 3.1: Overall schematic
As seen, D-type flip-flops have been included to allow sequential operation. When
computation ends, et signal also contains the modular exponentiation result, as the
last step (encoded as 11 in the multiplexers) undoes the change of variable.
S0 and S1 signals (S of select) have to be described with Moore’s state machines to
obtain a correct functionality. Signal CLK0 (CLK of clock) corresponds to the overall
circuit clock. Anyway, this clock is not going to be the slowest signal in the system
because the signal S0 is going to require an end flag signal to reach 11 state. Then,
let us define S0 and S1 signals and discuss about the enable signal EN0.
It must be noticed that all the schematics in this section are only orientative. En-
counter RTL Compiler may synthesize the design in a different way. In this sense, and
only to simplify schematics, flip-flops appear as synchronous with each CLK signal.
In the VHDL description all flip-flops are synchronous to the fastest clock CLK2 and
the other clocks are enable signals for each one. Also, there is an overall reset signal.
FIGURE 3.2: S1 signal generator
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Since S1 is easier to define, let us start with it. S1 must be at logic 0 in the first
clock and later at 1. This is a trivial state machine represented in Figure 3.2, where
the names of the states correspond to the S1 output. It must be noticed that in this
design, flip-flops requiring it, are initialized at logic 0 using the already mentioned
reset signal, or any other clock if it is required.
The selection signal S0 is harder to define. First of all, it must be remembered that S0,
which is the main selection signal, switches between doubling and multiplication.
So, one important parameter is the current exponent bit αi. Another parameter is an
end flag which notes the end of the exponent. This allows to the circuit to undo the
change of variable correctly.
The parameter, noted as C12, can be obtained with a 13-bit standard counter working
with 2 · CLK0. In fact, 212 = 4096, so the thirteenth output in counter is the required
signal. As with S1, Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding state machine and schematic:
FIGURE 3.3: S0 signal generator
When αi = 0, only a doubling must be performed. This means EN0 = 0 after the
doubling operation. Else, when αi = 1, EN0 = 1. Enable signal EN0 also affects the
internal MP D-type flip-flops to avoid repeating another doubling operation.
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Value αi can be obtained from a shift register with α previously loaded and also
working with 2 · CLK0. The proposed SPA countermeasure is based in the timing
control of this shift register and S0, but this will be introduced in the next section.
3.1.2 Montgomery Product Structure
MP operator structure can be deduced from Algorithm 2.4. In this case, let us analize
the circuit in two steps. The first step consists in a global view of the multiplier
without describing algorithm loop (Iterative Process, IP). This is shown in Figure 3.5.
As seen, the algorithm comparison is simplified by using the subtraction result sign,
s4097. To perform an MP, a 4098-bit adder and subtractor are required. Then, Fig-
ure 3.4 shows the IP block internally. This circuit has been designed to use only one
adder.
By taking a closer look on the two schematics, it can be seen that the adder and the
subtractor can be replaced by only one operator, mixing the circuits, as introduced
in Chapter 2. The result is shown in Figure 3.6.
FIGURE 3.4: Iterative process schematic
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FIGURE 3.5: Montgomery Product partial schematic
FIGURE 3.6: Montgomery Product schematic
Similarly to the previous subsection, let us design S2’, S3 and S4 signal generators.
S3 signal is equivalent to S1, but it has to been reset for each MP process (with
CLK0). In Figure 3.4, S2 signal should alternate logic values 0 and 1. However, in
Figure 3.6, the introduced modifications require a new signal S2’ that works as S2 but
after 4096 clocks it must stay at logic 1 to allow u subtraction. In fact, that end flag
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signal is done, as C12, with a counter, but this new counter C′12 must be reset with
CLK0. Also, S2’ can be expressed as S2’ = S2 or C′12, where S2 takes its inverse for
each CLK2. Finally, S4 signal must take logic 1 after 4096 clocks, so it is equivalent
to C′12.
To wrap things up, the design shown in this subsection fulfills one of the goals intro-
duced at the beginning: with only one adder/subtractor and a proper surrounding
logic, modular exponentiation can be computed. This is a great enough area reduc-
tion by sequentializing.
3.1.3 Adder/Subtractor Structure
As shown in the state of the art chapter, the CLA is the fastest known adder when the
number of bits is large. Also, this adder can be modified to operate as a subtractor
just setting c0 = 1 and inverting the subtrahend.
Since rn has one more bit than the MP operands, the CLA must operate as a (n+ 2)-
bit adder to be able to detect the result sign. Thus, as a 4098-bit CLA can not be
shown in schematic form, in this section the design is going to be mostly treated as
an algorithm.
To be coherent with the previous sections, this adder has to be designed to have a
low delay, because it is the only large circuit which is combinational in the entire
design. This is going to require some changes and extensions in the algorithms
presented in the state of the art.
First of all, propagation function must be redefined in a more convenient form using
De Morgan’s laws:
pi = ai + bi = ai · bi (3.1)
ci+1 = gi + pici = gi · pici (3.2)
Since to operate as a subtractor the CLA requires inverters in the operands, express-
ing pi as shown does not increase delay. In fact, delay is reduced because of using
NAND gates. So, as shown in Figure 3.7, this circuit only uses NAND gates.
FIGURE 3.7: ci+1 computation
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However, if these circuits are concatenated, a linear delay is expected. So, by using
PPA algorithms, a logarithmic delay is going to be obtained. The question is which
topology is the best for this application. If we take a closer look to Figure 2.2, the 3D
taxonomy graph, topologies near the bottom must be discarded. This is because a
high wire density topology is not good for synthesizing a large adder like a 4098-bit
one. Top face topologies have to be preseved then.
Between top face topologies, Brent-Kung must be also discarded because is slower
(more logic depth). Finally, Ladner-Fisher has been selected. In fact, it has less area
(less fanout) than Sklansky and it is faster than Brent-Kung, so it has a great balance.
Once the topology is selected, let us implement it.
Firstly, let us try to parallelize the carries computation by generalizing the genera-
tion and propagation functions (Gi and Pi):
ci = Gi + Pi · c0 = Gi · Pi · c0 (3.3)
This expression can be computed with the same Figure 3.7 circuit, but in parallel.
Generalized functions can be obtained by setting a new operation dot (•) and the
recurssive algorithm shown below:
(gj, pj) • (gk, pk) = (gj + pj · gk, pj · pk) = (gj · pj · gk, pj · pk) (3.4)
(Gi, Pi) = (gi, pi) • (gi−1, pi−1) • ... • (g1, p1) • (g0, p0) (3.5)
As shown, Gi and Pi have linear delay. But, by using Ladner-Fisher’s Dot Procedure
(DP), shown in Algorithm 3.1, all Gi and Pi can be computed with a delay of the form:
tDP = log2(n + 2) · tdot (3.6)
Algorithm 3.1 : DP(n,piin)
piout(0 : n/2− 1) = DP(n/2, piin(0 : n/2− 1))
pimed(0 : n/2− 1) = DP(n/2, piin(n/2 : n− 1))
for i = 0 : n/2− 1
piout(i + n/2) = pimed(i) • piout(n/2− 1)
end
return piout
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Value piin(i) correspond to (gi, pi). Thus, piin is the complete set of generate and
propagate pairs, while piout is the complete set of generalized generate and propa-
gate pairs.
By taking a look back, it can be seen that the carries computation delay is not com-
pletely logarithmic. Since (3.3) execution is not included in DP, the carries compu-
tation delay has (3.7) form. As a reference value, Brent-Kung’s delay form is (3.8)
(according with [1] expressions in chapter 11):
tLF = log2(n + 2) · tdot + t(3.3) (3.7)
tBK = (2 log2(n + 2)− 2)tdot + t(3.3) (3.8)
As n is 4096 and tdot is equivalent to t(3.3) (two NAND gates delay), the proposed
delay for carries computation against Brent-Kung’s one leads to a great difference:
|tBK − tLF|
tBK
=
|(2 log2(n + 2)− 1) · tdot − (log2(n + 2) + 1) · tdot|
(2 log2(n + 2)− 1) · tdot
=
| log2(n + 2)− 2|
2 log2(n + 2)− 1
(3.9)
100 · |tBK − tLF|
tBK
∣∣∣∣∣
n=4096
= 43, 48% (3.10)
To sum, let us introduce the final proposed PPA algorithm, shown in Algorithm 3.2:
Algorithm 3.2
for i = 0 : n− 1
pi = ai · bi
gi = ai · bi
end
piout = DP(n,piin)
for i = 1 : n
ci = piout(i)(1) · piout(i)(0) · c0
end
for i = 0 : n− 1
si = ai + bi + ci (mod 2)
end
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Since Ladner-Fisher topology requires operands with power-of-two length, the 4098-
bit adder will be split in two adders of 2 and 4096 bits each.
Finally, the adder/subtractor circuit requires one multiplexor, whose selection sig-
nal is c0, to decide between the normal or the inverted subtrahend. The minuend is
always inverted.
3.2 Security Approach
In this section a realistic opponent model is introduced in order to justify the power
analysis countermeasures. After that, the countermeasure types already presented
in [3] are discussed. Finally, the selected countermeasure is implemented.
3.2.1 Opponent Model
In cryptography, an opponent is understood as a person with technical knowledge
and interest in discover the private key. As the method used in this thesis is RSA,
the related operation which involves private key is decryption (2.3). Also, as the
private key is the exponent in decryption, an SPA attack is very easy to perform.
In fact, DPA is more complex, because it requires high resolution mesurements and
a very accurate model. For this reason, in this work DPA countermeasures are not
going to be included in the design.
Thus, let us remember why an SPA attack is a good kind of attack to discover the pri-
vate key in an RSA sheme. As shown in Algorithm 2.2, there is a direct dependence
between the current bit of exponent (the private key in decryption) and multiplica-
tion, or MP(et, βt), which is only performed if αi = Ki = 1.
Since there is a power consumption related with multiplication, by looking for extra
power consumption in each CLK0 period, the private key can be obtained. This is
really easy in the design presented in this chapter, because EN0 literally disables the
flip-flops, which causes a low dynamic power consumption.
Let us assume that the circuit specifications are public, for example the clock speed,
and it will not be very difficult to detect multiplications in a power consumption
trace representation, that can be obtained by mesuring the power supply output
with an oscilloscope.
Taking this into account, the countermeasures must hide in some way α when MP(et, βt)
is computed.
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3.2.2 Countermeasure Selection
Following the same order as the presented SPA countermeasures in the state of the
art, let us discuss them:
• Performing a multiplication and a doubling in each step independently of the
current bit, and later select the result depending on the current bit. This would
solve the problem, but the circuit would double the power consumption and
the area. So, this is not a good solution.
• Performing the same operation in each cycle. Since multiplication and dou-
bling are actually MP operations, with a clock period of 1 operation (and not
2), but enabling multiplication with a new signal EN1, it should be difficult to
differentiate between the two operations. This is the best solution for the pro-
posed design because does not increase the power consumption or the area.
• To set a sequence of operations performed always in the same order is not
possible because the number of operations depends on the number of logic
ones in the exponent.
Once the convenient countermeasure is selected, let us present the expected power
traces for each version, shown in Figure 3.8.
The SPA resistant power trace can be obtained by introducing these changes:
• To set a new S0’ selection signal which depends on αi to reach multiplication
state. S0’ generator is shown in Figure 3.9.
• To remove EN0 signal from the flip-flops and to set a new α shift register en-
abled by EN1 when αi = 0 or when αi = 1 and the doubling operation has
been already done. The circuit with these specifications is in Figure 3.10.
FIGURE 3.8: Estimated power traces
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FIGURE 3.9: S0’ signal generator
FIGURE 3.10: αi signal generator
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• To add the EN1 signal to the main C12 counter, that now operates with CLK0
(not 2 · CLK0).
In Figure 3.10, an auxiliar logic function z has been introduced to simplify Moore’s
state machine diagrams. Once the SPA resistant design has been defined, the next
chapter shows the presented hypothesis on power traces are certainly accomplished.
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Synthesis and Simulation
This chapter is devoted to the verification of the two designs presented in the last
chapter: the original and the SPA resistant versions. At the end of the chapter, sim-
ulation results are presented.
4.1 Verification Plan
There are three main goals in the verification plan. Firstly, it has to be proven that
both designs work properly from an arithmetic point of view. This means they out-
put the correct results. Secondly, it has also to be proven that SPA resistant power
trace hides the private key as expected. Thirdly, the 4096-bit version specifications
(area, power and delay) must be obtained.
So, to achieve these goals, the steps below need to be carried out:
• To write a VHDL version of each design. Obviously, this transcription may in-
troduce some changes to the circuits presented in the design chapter. Anyway,
these changes do not affect functionality.
• To simulate without gate delays to corroborate that designs are correct from a
functional point of view.
• To synthesize the designs into logic gates.
• To simulate with gate delays to prove that designs still work after synthesis. If
they do not work, to rewrite the VHDL code to meet the compilator specifica-
tions.
• To get the power trace of each version while a modular exponentiation opera-
tion is performed.
The flow diagram below shows how these steps are carried out:
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FIGURE 4.1: Verification plan flow diagram
Now, let us explain in detail each step. About the VHDL description, Appendix A
contains the complete module description using 1993 VHDL version. This descrip-
tion only includes the last version, which is prepared to be synthesized and simu-
lated with delays. In fact, by only simulating without delays the system cannot be
considered as fully functional. Let us comment some interesting code fragments.
For example, all selection signals and counters are described in the behaviour do-
main. Let us see how by seeing the S2 generator and C′12 architectures:
architecture arch of s2 is ...
process (CLK2) begin
if rising_edge(CLK2) then
if CLK0 = '1' then state <= e0;
else
case state is
when e0 => state <= e1;
when e1 => state <= e0;
end case;
end if;
end if;
end process;
process (state) begin
case state is
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when e0 => S2 <= '0';
when e1 => S2 <= '1';
end case;
end process;
end arch;
As seen, S2 generator is described as a Moore’s state machine. One process controls
the states while the other controls the output.
architecture arch of c12 is ...
C12 <= c(log2n) and c(0);
process (CLK2) begin
if rising_edge(CLK2) then
if CLK0 = '1' then c <= (others => '0');
else
if CLK1 = '1' then c <= c + '1'; end if;
end if;
end if;
end process;
end arch;
In the counter code above, the unsigned module of the library is used to add 1 easily
to the counter register.
Another interesting architecture is the DP. This is because DP is a recurssive code
which generate new structures depending on a generic by using if...generate state-
ment:
architecture arch of dp is ...
if_e2: if n = 2 generate
gen_g(0) <= g(0);
gen_p(0) <= p(0);
gen_g(1) <= g(1) or (p(1) and g(0));
gen_p(1) <= p(1) and p(0);
end generate;
if_g2: if n > 3 generate
ins_dp_low: entity work.dp
generic map(n=>n/2)
port map(g((n/2-1) downto 0), p((n/2-1) downto 0), aux_g_0, aux_p
_0);
ins_dp_high: entity work.dp
generic map(n=>n/2)
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port map(g((n-1) downto (n/2)), p((n-1) downto (n/2)), aux_g_1, a
ux_p_1);
for_high_0: for i in 0 to (n/4-1) generate
gen_g(i+n/2) <= (aux_p_1(i) and aux_g_0(n/2-1)) or aux_g_1(i);
gen_p(i+n/2) <= aux_p_1(i) and aux_p_0(n/2-1);
end generate;
for_high_1: for i in n/4 to (n/2-1) ...
gen_g((n/2-1) downto 0) <= aux_g_0;
gen_p((n/2-1) downto 0) <= aux_p_0;
end generate;
end arch;
As shown, there is a base case where n = 2. The other case calls again the DP mod-
ule. One remarkable comment is that in all the modules the for...generate statements
are split into 1024 iterations sets. This is because Encounter RTL Compiler has an
instance generation limit of 1024 in these kind of statementes.
Once the description has been introduced, the commands which allow to simulate
are included in Appendix B. In a work directory a library of VHDL entities and archi-
tectures is generated. The next step is synthesis by using the Encounter RTL Compiler.
The commands needed to carry out this step are also included in the same appendix.
Anyway, some comments about these commands are required.
First of all, in order to get easy-to-analyze results, n is going to be set as 16 and not
4096 in order to verify the functionality and the countermeasure. Results are extrap-
olable to the 4096-bit versions. The library used for the synthesis is from STMicro-
electronics ®. It is a 1.2V standard 65 nm CMOS library named as CORE65LPSVT_
nom_1.20V_25C.
By default, synthesis is performed in a generic way and the compiler decides which
gates and how many of them are necessary to take from the library. To increase
optimitzation, a flatten design without module hierachy is forced by using:
ungroup -flatten -all
To get the 4096-bit specifications, more constrains have to be introduced. As it will
be shown in results section, there is a problem when overpassing 1024-bit design
synthesis, where the Encounter RTL Compiler gets stucked. To deal with that, a solu-
tion is to make a prediction by using specifications from 4-bit to 1024-bit. In order
to get a coherent tendency, compiler automatic optimitzation must be limited.
By using only one type of gate for logic synthesis, this can be accomplished. Since
when Encounter RTL Compiler is instructed to perform the synthesis using NAND2X2
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gates only, it produces a gate level netlist which is not fully functional, in order to
get a functional design, NOR2X2 gates have been chosen instead. To achieve this,
commands below must be included:
set_attribute avoid 1 [find / -libcell *]
set_attribute avoid 0 [find / -libcell *_NOR2X2*]
set_attribute avoid 1 [find / -libcell *_NOR2X25*]
set_attribute avoid 0 [find / -libcell *IVX*]
set_attribute avoid 0 [find / -libcell *DFPQX*]
set_attribute avoid 1 [find / -libcell *SDFPQX*]
These commands disable all gates and then enable NOR2X2, inverters of any fanout,
and D-type flip-flops. It must be noticed that synthesis output is a Verilog file.
Once the design is synthesized and simulated, power traces have to be generated.
For doing that, Cadence ® brings a good solution. By setting next commands in ncsim
console all nodal activity is registered during a period of time:
dumptcf -scope ins_modexp -output period_i.tcf -overwrite
run $PERIOD
dumptcf -end
Thus, by using a script generator, each period can be monitorized. Later, using the
Encounter RTL Compiler, the average power in each period can be reported to get a
power trace. Finally, after this process, which is long, a script is used to collect all
the results and elaborate the power trace for each design. In this case, a period of
100 ns has been used to not interfere in the synthesis optimitzation.
Once the verification plan has been presented, let us see the results.
4.2 Results
The first interesting result is the demonstration that both 16-bit versions work as
expected. However, since the simulations are very large, only some parts of them
are shown in detail. So, Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show these simulation
fragments.
For the simulations shown below, α = 5DF3, β = A22A, u = AF81, 2n (mod u) =
507F and 22n (mod u) = 5F96. With an online calculator it has been proven that
βα (mod u) = B58.
Both Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show modular exponentiation. It can be seen how
EN0 and EN1 work, the C12 counter, the change of variable βt computation at the
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beginning and also how S0 changes the state in a different way in each simulation.
FIGURE 4.2: Modular exponentiation simulation (SPA vulnerable)
FIGURE 4.3: Modular exponentiation simulation (SPA resistant)
In the next simulation, included in Figure 4.4, it can be seen how the MP starts, the
clocks shape, the selection signals, the x shift register and, at the end of the MP, the
subtraction to obtain the next et. Also, some addition operations are shown.
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FIGURE 4.4: Montgomery Product simulation
Once simulations have been presented, let us introduce the two power traces, on
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, according to the second verification plan goal. Onto these
traces the private key in binary form has been printed to allow to see the counter-
measure effect.
The periods without a bit correspond to the signal estabilitzation and βt computa-
tion (at the beginning); and the MP inverse to get the result from et (last period).
To conclude results presentation, in the next page a table (Table 4.1) is provided with
the specifications obtained for each version and for each key length from 4 to 1024
bits.
FIGURE 4.5: Power trace (SPA vulnerable)
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FIGURE 4.6: Power trace (SPA resistant)
SPA Vulnerable Resistant
n Area Power Delay Area Power Delay
[µm2 ] [mW] [ps] [µm2 ] [mW] [ps]
4 1596 0,06 2229 1556 (−2,51%) 0,06 (+ 6,18%) 2214 (−0,67%)
8 2681 0,12 2583 2631 (−1,86%) 0,11 (− 7,85%) 2583 ( 0,00%)
16 4834 0,22 2940 4781 (+9,06%) 0,19 (−14,40%) 2940 ( 0,00%)
32 9189 0,39 3274 9139 (−0,54%) 0,29 (−25,86%) 3334 (+1,83%)
64 18009 0,62 3295 17947 (−0,34%) 0,67 (+ 7,79%) 3593 (+9,04%)
128 35872 1,38 3802 35939 (+0,19%) 1,49 (+ 7,63%) 3802 ( 0,00%)
256 72194 2,87 4775 72133 (−0,08%) 2,85 (− 0,75%) 4774 (−0,02%)
512 146227 6,44 5997 146151 (−0,05%) 4,84 (−24,74%) 6035 (+0,63%)
1024 296232 11,34 6922 296066 (−0,06%) 11,80 (− 4,06%) 6950 (+0,40%)
Estimated specifications
2048 590784 23,17 8020 590511 (−0,05%) 22,90 (− 1,20%) 8067 (+0,59%)
4096 1181919 46,31 9078 1181400 (−0,04%) 45,86 (− 0,97%) 9137 (+0,65%)
TABLE 4.1: Circuit specifications summary (NOR2X2)
Using this data, an estimation for a 4096-bit design has been carried out. The power
specifications have been obtained in nW, but they are shown in mW.
The estimated specifications in the table above have been obtained from the linear
regressions in (Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8) and from a logarithmic regression in (Fig-
ure 4.9). The logarithmic regression is performed as a linear one with a log2 n change
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of variable, taking the values after 64-bit. Trend lines are included on Table 4.2. Delay
refeers to the critical path, which is the addition operation in each CLK2 period.
Each specification in the SPA resistant version column includes a relative compari-
son to the SPA vulnerable version.
FIGURE 4.7: Area - n graph
FIGURE 4.8: Power consumption - n graph
SPA Vulnerable (R2 ≥ 0, 99) Resistant (R2 ≥ 0, 99)
Area [µm2 ] 288, 64n− 350, 30 288, 52n− 377, 76
Power [nW] 11297, 07n + 38412, 21 11213, 30n− 69061
Delay [ps] 1058, 2 log2 n− 3620, 7 [n ≥ 128] 1070, 5 log2 n− 3709 [n ≥ 128]
TABLE 4.2: Trend lines for area, delay and power on both designed versions
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FIGURE 4.9: Delay - log2 n graph
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Discussion
5.1 Comments on Results
In this section results are discussed in the same order as they have been presented
in the last chapter. Thus, let us start with simulation including delays. As seen in
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, both versions work properly. Details have not been given,
but both designs have been evaluated with various inputs in order to corroborate
their functionality.
These simulations show that there is an initial period to allow signals estabilization.
Such estabilization time has not been mentioned in Chapter 3 but it is mandatory in
order to get the system ready for the computation.
The execution time is clearly different between versions. In the case shown, there is
a 14,3 % time reduction with the SPA resistant version. If the key bits are balanced
properly, this time reduction could rise until the 50 % mark.
Without a power trace, in these simulations is also noticeable that the first version is
SPA vulnerable. That is because when αi = 0 all values are mantained during some
CLK0 periods.
Another remarkable fact is about the clocks duty cycles and their timings. In Fig-
ure 4.4 is shown how CLK0 and CLK1 must be advanced to ensure they enable
properly when CLK2 rises. Also duty cycles are small to avoid interferences.
In this simulation can be seen how in each MP there is also one stabilitzation CLK1
period at the beginning. After that, f become a zeros vector. In each CLK2 period an
addition is performed. When S2 = 1, if a is even, then the addition is not computed,
because a can already be right-shifted.
As a last comment of these simulations, subtraction performed in the MP shown
above corresponds to the case where rn < u, thus, et gets rn.
38 Chapter 5. Discussion
Now, let us comment power traces. In fact, there are not many surprises because
they meet with hypothesis in Figure 3.8. If the opponent can generate a power trace
like the one in Figure 4.5, only by setting zeros on low power periods and ones in
the rest, the private key is revealed. In opposition to the SPA vulnerable version, the
SPA resistant version manages to hide these low power gaps. The rest of the power
traces are identical.
Finally, let us comment on specifications. As expected, area increases linearly (Fig-
ure 4.7). Ladner-Fisher topology doubles the number of DP entities when the operand
length is doubled, so, that is proportional. All the other circuit parts seem to follow
the same proportional rule.
If the area tendency is linear, power consumption is expected to be linear too. This
is shown in Figure 4.8, with one exception: 512-bits. Since R2 is 0,99; maybe that
exception is because the compiler optimizes this version in a different way, or it is
just specifications variance.
Delay tendency, shown in Figure 4.9, denotes one important thing about the com-
piler: after 128-bit, the adder optimitzation changes.It is known that the Encounter
RTL Compiler algorithms identify the adder structures. Maybe after 128-bit it can not
identify properly these structures or any other applied optimization after this point
(128 bits) is not capable of maintaining the previous delay tendency. This explains a
rising of delay per bit.
In fact, all values except 64-bit SPA vulnerable version (which does not fit as well as
expected), correspond to one of the two logarithmic regressions that can be made,
according to Ladner-Fisher’s carries delay form. The one after 128 bits has been
already presented (4.1), and the one before 128 bits corresponds to 350, 9 log2 n +
1529, 2; in the SPA resistant version.
There are no relevant differences between area or delay specifications for both ver-
sions (<10%). However, in the SPA resistant version, in average, there is a decrease
of power consumption.
Thus, if the compiler does not change optimitzation algorithm after 128 bits, the
estimation introduced will be close enough from the real result. Anyway, it can
be almost ensured that CLK2 can operate at 100 MHz in a 4096-bit version. If the
private key has half zeros, modular exponentiation would be computed in about
504 ms, which is good enough. This is deduced from:
#CLK0 = 3+ 2 · #(αi = 1) + #(αi = 0) (5.1)
#CLK1 = (2+ n) · #CLK0 (5.2)
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#CLK2 = 2 · #CLK1 (5.3)
tβα (mod u) = tCLK2 · #CLK2 (5.4)
This value of 504 ms, is the average execution time. The fastest scenario happens
with a full zeros private key, then, modular exponentiation is computed in about 336
ms. The slowest scenario happens with a full ones private key, performing modular
exponentiation in about 672 ns, which is the execution time of all the SPA vulnerable
runs independently of the private key.
5.2 Estimated Costs
The next table represents a summary of the costs of the equipment and Non-Recurring
Engineering (NRE) necessary to obtain the thesis results.
Item Time [h] €/h Total [€]
NRE
• Design 200 15 3000
• Synthesis 40 15 600
• Verification 80 15 1200
• Director’s supervision 80 40 3200
Equipment
• Server amortization 80 0,130 10
• Server usage 80 0,300 24
• Computer amortization 320 0,022 7
• Computer usage 280 0,036 10
• Cadence ® license 80 0,205 16
Total [€] 8067
TABLE 5.1: Estimated costs summary
The cost per hour of NRE is for a junior engineer with a salary of 30000 €/year. The
server and computer usages have been calculated with a price of 0,12 €/kWh and
powers of 2,5 kW (server and cooling) and 0,3 kW (computer).
The amortization has been calculated by using a server cost of 8000€ and a computer
cost of 950€ in 7 years (server) and 5 years (computer). The license price can be found
in the Cadence ® webpage: 1800€ in the first year.
40 Chapter 5. Discussion
5.3 Conclusions
As derived from the result discussion above, all the goals have been successfully
fulfilled. Both designs are working in the way concieved in the design chapter. Also,
the countermeasure has efficiently managed to hide the private key to the opponent
by making the system SPA resistant.
Although there have been lots of practical difficulties while using Cadence ® soft-
ware, results, including NOR2X2 synthesis, are accurate enough to get some oper-
ating bounds, such as the average execution time of 504 ms.
Since the design presented works in a sequential scheme, its area specifications
should be lower than most 4096-bit versions of an RSA system, provided that their
adders/subtractors were fully combinational.
Once the 16-bit design of the SPA resistant version has been proven to work and
before to think about synthesizing a definitive 4096-bit version, it would be interest-
ing to explore other side-channel attack conuntermeasures to prevent other kind of
attacks that the one shown in this thesis. This means to redesign and to ensure that
the countermeasures do not interfere between them.
Surely, the most important concept introduced in this thesis is that just modifying
the control system (not the data system), a modular exponentiation module can re-
sist side-channel attacks while reducing overall execution time.
As personal considerations, it has been interesting to explore PPA adder topologies,
and more generally, all the whole set of algorithms needed to complete a modular
exponentiation module. It has been motivating to work on a large and complex
hardware design, which has application nowadays.
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